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MALPRACTICE REVIEW PANELS:
EFFICIENCY OR JUDICIAL DEATH?
Colton v. Riccobono1
The constitutionality of state statutes requiring review of medical mal-
practice claims by a malpractice panel as a condition precedent to trial has
been the source of much litigation.' These acts (hereinafter "panel acts") were
motivated by the so-called medical malpractice "crisis."' In the mid-1970's,
health care providers and other interested citizens became concerned that
many malpractice claims were frivolous and requested unrealistic damages.
4
State legislators responded by trying to find a means to limit malpractice fil-
ings to those cases which might have merit,5 thereby reducing the economic
consequences to health care seekers.' This note discusses the constitutionality
of these statutes as considered by the courts, both before they operated exten-
sively and after experience in their operation.
The panel acts are designed to provide for a process of screening malprac-
tice cases. The screening panels or review boards are used prior to trial to
dispense with unmeritorious claims. These panels are distinguished from arbi-
tration panels in that their decision is not final and binding.7 The panel acts
1. 67 N.Y.2d 571, 496 N.E.2d 670, 505 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1986).
2. See infra notes 8 & 9.
3. The "crisis" has been described by one authority as being "more a product of
the way the insurance industry does business than of changes in medical malpractice
litigation." Hunter & Borzilleri, The Liability Insurance Crisis, 22 TRIAL 42, 43
(1986). Defendants and their insurers are paying more money today than they did in
years past, but is it out of proportion to other changes in the world? The Rand study of
Chicago litigation found that a large proportion of awards made to plaintiffs are for
their injuries and those costs have been rising far faster than inflation. See Saks, In
Search of the 'Lawsuit Crisis,' 14 L., MED. & HEALTH CARE 77-79 (1986). For a look
at why and how the "crisis" surfaced in the United States, see Terry, The Technical
and Conceptual Flaws of Medical Malpractice Arbitration, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 571
(1986).
4. Terry, supra note 3, at 573.
5. See State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hospital v. Gaertner, 583
S.W.2d 107, 117 (Mo. 1979) (en banc) (Morgan, C.J., dissenting); State ex rel.
Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 508, 261 N.W.2d 434, 442 (Wis. 1978) (stating
the purpose behind the Wisconsin legislature in passing their panel acts). See also Red-
ish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional
Implications, 55 TEX. L. REV. 759 (1977).
6. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d at 508, 261 N.W.2d at 442.
7. See generally Comment, Alternatives to Litigation: Pretrial Screening and
Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims: Has Missouri Taken a Giant Step Back-
ward?, 50 UMKC L. REV. 182, 185-86 (1982); see also Mo. REV. STAT. § 538 (1978).
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vary in their provisions. Some statutes require the claim to go to arbitration
prior to filing the claim with the courts, 8 others allow for arbitration after
filing the claim in court.' Some acts allow the panel decision to be allowed into
evidence in a subsequent jury trial.'"
8. Panel acts which provide for review of the malpractice case prior to filing the
claim have been held constitutional in the following cases: Wis. STAT. § 655 (1975),
construed in Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d at 491, 261 N.W.2d at 434; MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A01-2A09 (Cum. Supp. 1977), construed in Attorney General v.
Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57 (Md. 1972); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-2801-2855
(Supp. 1976), construed in Pendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (Neb.
1977); IND. CODE §§ 16-9.5-1-1-.5-10-5 (Supp. 1979), construed in Johnson v. St. Vin-
cent Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. 1980); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. §§
1301.501-.514 (Supp. 1977), construed in Parker v. Children's Hosp., 483 Pa. 106, 394
A.2d 932 (Pa. 1978), rev'd Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (Pa.
1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.41-.48 (West 1977), construed in Seoane v.
Ortho Pharmaceuticals, 472 F. Supp. 468 (E.D. La. 1979), aff'd, 660 F.2d 146 (5th
Cir. 1981); see also Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256 (La. 1978) (interpreting
Louisiana act); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-6-101 (1977), construed in Linder v. Smith,
629 P.2d 1187 (Mont. 1981); FLA. STAT. § 768.133 (1975), construed in Carter v.
Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); FLA. STAT.
§§ 768.16-.27-.47 (1977), construed in Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164
(5th Cir. 1979); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.1-.20 (1960), construed in Diantonio v.
Northampton-Accomack Memorial Hosp., 628 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1980).
Panel acts which provide for review of the case prior to filing the claim which have
been found unconstitutional are as follows: Mo. REV. STAT. § 538 (Supp. 1976), con-
strued in Cardinal Glennon, 583 S.W.2d at 107; 40 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1301.501-514
(Supp. 1980-81), construed in Mattos, 491 Pa. at 385, 421 A.2d at 190; FLA. STAT. §
768.4 (1979), construed in Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla.1980).
9. Panel acts which provide for review of the malpractice case after filing in the
court system have been held valid in the following cases: N.Y. JUD. LAW § 148-a (Mc-
Kinney 1983), construed in Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 A.D.2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122
(N.Y. App. Div. 1976), a.fd, 401 N.Y.2d 200 (N.Y. 1977); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 231, § 60B (West 1975), construed in Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645,
369 N.E.2d 985 (Mass. 1977); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-567 (1977), construed in
Eastin v. Bloomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (Ariz. 1977) (en banc); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 18, § 6814 (1974), construed in DiFilippo v. Beck, 520 F. Supp. 1009 (D.
Del. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6802 (1974), construed in Lacy v. Green, 428
A.2d 1171 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981).
A panel act which provides for review after filing the claim was held unconstitu-
tional in the following case: ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1013a, ch. 110, § 58.2-58,10, ch.
83, § 22.1, and ch. 70, § 101 (1975), construed in Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp.,
63 111. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (II1. 1976).
10. See Comment, infra note 11, at 186-7. The New York statute allows a unan-
imous decision by the panel to be used as evidence by either party. Arguments have
been made that this violates the hearsay rule by not allowing cross examination at the
time of the decision. The New York courts have responded that the evidence may not
by the sole basis of a judgment, but the jury may weigh the evidence as it sees fit.
Therefore, the court states in Comisky, "[t]he jury is left as the final arbiter of the fact
[Vol. 1988
2
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1988, Iss.  [1988], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1988/iss/12
MALPRACTICE REVIEW PANELS
The composition of arbitration panels also varies according to statute.
Typically, the panels are composed of a member of the legal profession, one or
more members of the medical profession, and at least one nonlegal, nonmedi-
cal, noninsurer member." New York provides for all hearings to be held
before a Justice of the Supreme Court, a physician, and an attorney." A Mis-
souri statute, since held invalid, provided for a panel ("Professional Liability
Review Board") composed of six members, including a circuit court judge, two
attorneys at law, two professionals, at least one of whom must be a member of
one of the specialties involved, and one lay representative. ' s
The constitutionality of the New York panel act was challenged in Colton
v. Riccobono." The statute was challenged as depriving the plaintiff of her
access to the courts and thereby violating her fourteenth amendment due pro-
cess rights.' 5 In the underlying action, the plaintiff sought damages against a
hospital and physicians for the wrongful death of her husband as a result of
medical malpractice.' 6 The statute in Colton required that as a condition pre-
cedent to the trial of a medical malpractice action, a panel consisting of a
judge, physician, and attorney must hear and evaluate the evidence and issue a
recommendation on the question of liability." 7 The procedure, as outlined in
the Colton opinion, specified that after a note of issue is filed, the clerk of the
court schedules a prepanel hearing where the parties may discuss the merits of
the case and, if no settlement is possible, at least agree upon the particular
medical specialty involved." The hearing is to be informal with no record, and
if the panel members agree as to liability, a formal written recommendation
will be forwarded to all parties." A unanimous recommendation is admissible
in the subsequent trial of the action, and the attorney and physician panel
members may be called to testify by either party."
The petitioner, Mrs. Colton, claimed her due process rights were violated
question. Comisky, 55 A.D.2d at 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 128. See also Comment,
Constitutional Challenges to Medical Malpractice Review Boards, 46 TENN. L. REv.
607, 612 (1979).
II. Note, Medical Malpractice Mediation Panels: A Constitutional Analysis, 46
FORDHAM L REV. 322, 326 (1977).
12. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 148-a.
13. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 538.025 (held invalid in Cardinal Glennon, 583
S.W.2d at 107).
14. 67 N.Y.2d 571, 496 N.E.2d 670, 505 N.Y.S.2d 581 (N.Y. 1986).
15. Id. at 574, 496 N.E.2d at 672, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 583.
16. Id. The plaintiff alleged the defendents were negligent in recommending and
performing a surgical procedure from which her husband ultimately died.
17. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 148-a.
18. Id.; Colton, 67 N.Y.2d at 575, 496 N.E.2d at 672, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 583.
19. N.Y JUD. LAW § 148-a; Colton, 67 N.Y.2d at 575, 496 N.E.2d at 672, 505
N.Y.S.2d at 583.
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in that the statute deprived her of access to the courts because of delay in
assembling a hearing panel.' 1 The Colton court, citing Bodie v. Connecticut,"
recognized that in keeping with due process, a party must have an opportunity
to be heard, but how the state chooses to provide for this hearing may vary."3
The court recognized that only fundamental rights are protected by the United
States Constitution and "when no such fundamental interest is at stake, the
State is free to condition access to the court. . . ."" However, the court did
recognize that a state may create a right of access in its own Constitution.'
Mrs. Colton argued that the New York Constitution created a right of access
to the courts for wrongful death claims which should not be denied
arbitrarily.26
The court concluded that the New York Constitution did not create a per
se right. to the civil courts, but does expressly provide for claims of wrongful
death."7 Therefore, Mrs. Colton's wrongful death claim could not be denied
21. Id. at 575, 496 N.E.2d at 672-73, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 584. The petitioner also
argued that she was denied access to the courts because the panel review could not
proceed since a proper specialist, as required by statute, could not be found to sit on
the panel. However, the court found this argument was not raised below and hence was
not preserved for appeal. Id.
Other cases have expounded on the arguments plaintiff raised that the panel acts
violate due process:
(1) During time allowed for review panel the defendant may leave and escape
process. (2) Special pleading problems where defendant not required to file
answer prior to hearing. (3) Added financial burden in excess of trial, should
it go to trial. (Should the case go to trial the plaintiff not only had to produce
evidence for the panel but for the trial also). (4) Panel may be weighted with
health care providers so as to be biased. (5) Denial of the right to present all
claims in one suit.
See Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d at 491, 261 N.W.2d at 434. Contra Cardinal Glennon, 583
S.W.2d at 107. In this regard, Missouri is the only 'state high court to hold that the
procedure is a violation of due process. However, the dissent in Cardinal Glennon lik-
ens the procedure to a pretrial conference (Morgan, C.J., dissenting). Other courts
have found certain aspects of the procedure to be a violation. For example, the Arizona
Supreme Court found a violation of free access to the courts where a bond was re-
quired prior to proceeding to trial. Eastin v. Bloomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744
(1977) (en banc).
22. 401 U.S. 371, 375-76 (1971).
23. Bodie, 401 U.S. at 378, stating that "[T]he formality and procedural requi-
sites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved
and the nature of the subsequent proceedings." The court further held in Bodie that
the right of access for all individuals is not a right that is, in all circumstances, guaran-
teed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 383.
24. Colton, 67 N.Y.2d at 573, 496 N.E.2d at 673, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 584.
25. Id.
26. N.Y. CONST. Art. I, § 16.
27. Colton, 67 N.Y 2d at 573, 496 N.E.2d at 673, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 584.
[Vol. 1988230
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access to the civil courts as that right is expressly granted in the constitution."
Mrs. Colton argued that the panel act was procedurally unfair as it delayed
her trial."' In evaluating the proceedings, the court held that Mrs. Colton's
right of access was not denied in this instance." The court found that there
was no "egregious" delay to her trial due to the problems encountered in as-
sembling a medical malpractice review board."'
Other challenges to the panel acts have also been constitutional in nature.
The common arguments against the panel acts are that they violate equal pro-
tection, right to trial by jury, access to the courts, and are an improper delega-
tion of judicial power .3
The argument that the screening panel violates the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment is the most common challenge. The stan-
dard of review most often used for malpractice panel legislation is the "ration-
ale basis" test."3 The test analyzes whether there is a rational basis for passing
the act. The rational basis test is used to determine the constitutionality of
legislation which does not involve a fundamental right or a suspect class." The
test determines whether any "state of facts reasonably may be conceived to
justify it [the legislation]. "35 The panel acts, as a reaction to the medical mal-
practice crisis, have been held by many courts to be a rational way to curtail
any harm resulting from the crisis."
The argument that panel acts violate the right to trial by jury as granted
28. Id. "The right of action now existing to recover damages for injuries result-
ing in death, shall never be abrogated; and the amount recoverable shall not be subject
to any statutory limitation." N.Y. CONsT. Art. 1, § 16.
29. Colton, 67 N.Y.2d at 574, 496 N.E.2d at 674, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
30. The court stated that Mrs. Colton "failed to demonstrate that her case has
not moved toward hearing in timely fashion." Colton, 67 N.Y.2d at 574, 496 N.E.2d at
674, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
31. Id.
32. See Comment, supra note 7, at 191-99.
33. See Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 387, 404 N.E.2d 585, 594
(Ind. 1980), stating that in order to be consistent with due process, panel act legislation
"need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is
enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that
the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it." See also William-
son v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
34. See Comment, supra note 10, at 615.
35. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). See also L. TRIBE. AMER-
ICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1002 (1978).
36. The cases on this issue analyze the history and rise of the malpractice 'crisis'
and then decide whether the legislation reasonably addresses the problems. See, e.g.,
Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 A.D.2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976),
aff'd, 401 N.Y.S.2d 200 (N.Y. 1977); Parker v. Children's Hosp., 483 Pa. 106, 394
A.2d 932, 939 (Pa. 1978), rev'd, Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (Pa.
1980); Seoane v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 468, 472, affd, 660 F.2d
146, 149 (E. D. Lou. 1981); Linder v. Smith, 629 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Mont. 1981).
1988]
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in state constitutions has been raised. One argument is that the delay caused
by the process of assembling a panel and scheduling hearings violates the right
to trial by jury. In addition, admissibility of the panel decision at trial has
been argued as an impediment to trial by jury. Most courts have found that
these statutes do not prevent the right to trial by jury.3' Other courts have
held that pretrial screening does violate the right to trial by jury."
The argument that the pretrial panel denies free access to the courts is
usually rejected by state courts. 39 The typical approach is followed in Colton
where the court stated that since the act is a response to the medical malprac-
tice crisis, the legislation bears a rational relationship to alienating that prob-
lem and "does not violate substantive due process concerns."'"
The argument that the legislation is an improper delegation of judicial
power has been upheld in one jurisdiction." Most courts, however, find these
panels do not usurp judicial power because their decisions are not binding on
the parties."2
The majority view as to constitutionality is that they are valid as not only
having a rational basis, but as a means to better use judicial time by sifting
out the unmeritorious claims. Malpractice arbitration is seen as a modern
means to effectuate the most efficient ends without distorting the cost of medi-
cal care.
However, the validity of panel acts as upheld in Colton and the other
cases cited may not be fully settled.' 3 Two states, which initially upheld such
acts, held them invalid based on performance in that the procedures utilized
imposed a burden upon the right to a jury trial by delays or unfair methods in
implementation of the acts."
The Pennsylvania Health Care Services Malpractice Act' was held to be
37. See Comiskey, 55 A.D.2d at 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 122, affd, 401 N.Y.S.2d
200 (N.Y. 1977); Eastin v. Bloomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (Ariz. 1977) (en
banc); Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 369 N.E.2d 985 (Mass. 1977).
38. The rationale in determining that these acts violate trial by jury is that the
particular act either is unconstitutional on its face or is unconstitutional in practice.
See Cardinal Glennon, 583 S.W.2d at 107; Mattos, 491 Pa. at 385, 421 A.2d at 190;
Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp., 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (II. 1976).
39. See Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 805 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1041 (1977); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585,
596 (Ind. 1980). Cardinal Glennon, 583 S.W.2d at 107. (The Missouri court found
that the right of access to the courts traces back to the Magna Carta, is explicitly
preserved in the Constitution of Missouri, and no precondition can be imposed).
40. Colton, 67 N.Y.2d at 571, 496 N.E.2d at 670, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
41. Wright, 63 Ill. 2d at 313, 347 N.E.2d at 736.
42. Eastin, 116 Ariz. at 576, 570 P.2d at 744; Paro, 373 Mass. at 645, 369
N.E.2d at 985; Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d at 491, 261 N.W.2d at 434.
43. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
44. See infra notes 46, 58.
45. 40 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 1301 101 (Supp. 1977).
[Vol. 1988
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constitutionally valid in Parker v. Children's Hospital."' The Pennsylvania
court later found the act to be invalid in Mattos v. Thompson.'7 The court
stated, "the Act has failed in its goal to render expeditious resolution to medi-
cal malpractice claims and consequently imposes an oppressive burden upon
the right to jury trial guaranteed by our state constitution.""
The court in Mattos reevaluated their previous decision that the panel act
was constitutional. The court conceded that they had been skeptical of the Act
because, although valid on a theoretical level, the actual operation of the Act
might infringe upon the right to a jury trial." The court further stated their
concern over the postponement of the availability of the right in question.)
The Pennsylvania court analyzed the statistics of the Act and its operation and
found the Act to be repugnant to its stated purpose. The court stated, "the
arbitration panels provided for under the Act are incapable of providing the
'prompt determination and adjudication' of medical malpractice claims which
was the goal of the Act.""1
The court in Mattos agreed with the petitioner's arguments as set forth
below:
(I) The arbitration process created by the Act is filled with such intermi-
nable delay that it violates the guarantees in the state constitution of access to
the courts, justice without delay and the right to jury trials.
(2) By requiring litigants to try a complicated and expensive malpractice
action in arbitration prior to being permitted a jury trial, the Act places an
onerous and impermissible condition on the right to jury trials."
The court further found that the legislative purpose was to provide a more
expeditious disposition to enable the victim to avoid the delays within the judi-
cial system." However, the court recognized that the system was not as expe-
ditious as the legislature had planned." A statistical analysis relied on by the
court demonstrated that the average length of time between filing a certificate
of readiness and appointment of a chairperson for the panel was 7.57
months." The statistics also show that cases are not being resolved efficiently.
As of the time of the Mattos opinion, 73 percent of the cases filed had not
46. 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932 (Pa. 1978).
47. 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (Pa. 1980).
48. Id. at 388, 421 A.2d at 191.
49. id.
50. Id. at 388, 421 A.2d at 191.
51. Id., 421 A.2d at 192.
52. Id. at 391, 421 A.2d at 193. The court in Mattos does state where a compel-
ling state interest is designed to achieve the objective, there is no encroachment on the
right and arbitration is an accepted method of dispute resolution in Pennsylvania. Id.
53. Id. at 395-96, 421 A.2d at 195. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.102 (Pur-
don 1988).
54. Id. at 388, 421 A.2d at 191.
55. Id. at 390. 421 A.2d at 193.
1988] 233
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been resolved." The court terms "unconscionable" the fact that six of the
original cases had not been resolved despite the passage of four years.
The Supreme Court of Florida has also held its state's Medical Mediation
Act 67 to be invalid after finding it valid in previous cases. In Aldana v. Ho-
lub," the court found the Act unconstitutional "because the act in its opera-
tion has proven arbitrary and capricious." 5 Although the court stated it was
not questioning the previous case holding the Act constitutional," the decision
in Aldana "was based on the unfortunate fact that the medical mediation stat-
ute has proven unworkable and inequitable in practical operation."" The court
reviewed over seventy cases and found that due to inflexible time limits, con-
gested court dockets, and other reasons, in over fifty percent of the time "a
valuable legal right [the right to mediate] has arbitrarily evaporated through
no fault, of either party.""
The highest courts in Pennsylvania and Florida declared their panel acts
unconstitutional after they once were held to be valid by the same court. Both
courts evaluated the operation of the acts and found that the acts, in practical
use, did violate a constitutional right. The cases seem to stand as a warning to
other jurisdictions that should operation of the acts consistently prove egre-
gious, the act could be found invalid.
The court in Colton did not say New York's Act could never be held
invalid but limited the case to the facts presented. There was no argument or
evidence before the court regarding the overall operation of New York's panel
act, just contentions based on Mrs. Colton's experience with it. Whether addi-
tional information might have caused a different result is, of course, unknown.
Proponents of the panel acts should heed the warning of Pennsylvania and
Florida by observing the operation of the acts and ensuring that they uphold
their legislative purpose without substantially delaying the right to a jury trial.
It is not enough to enact such legislation. It must be effectively carried out. If
carried out effectively, the operation of the acts should be of benefit to all.
Plaintiffs would benefit from the speedy disposition of favorable panel results
in prior or subsequent settlement. Defendants would incur less costs without a
trial. The public would benefit by reducing judicial time and costs, the loss of
medical time, and the potential for lessening insurance rates.
Revisions and close monitoring of the panel acts should keep them work-
ing properly and see that they perform as contemplated. More qualified people
may have to be solicited to serve on the panels to relieve backlogs which ap-
56. Id. at 396, 421 A.2d at 195.
57. FLA. STAT. § 768.4 (1979).
58. 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980).
59. Id. at 235.
60. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041
(1977); Aldana, 381 So. 2d at 237.
61. Id. at 237.
62. Id. at 236-37.
[Vol. 1988
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pear to be the principle cause of delay. Better supervision by those in charge of
setting up the panels and seeing that they function effectively is necessary. If
the panel acts become mired down in bureaucracy and inefficiency, they likely
will die by judicial decree with little chance of reincarnation.
JANIS L. PREWITr
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